Many bad thing that happen in the world are not, in any obvious way, the result of human action or inaction, intention or negligence.
One could attempt to rebut the atheists`argument from natural evils by insisting that all of them are ultimately the result of human wrongdoing - the direct consequences of particular human acts, the indirect consequences of human dispositions corrupted in ``the fall,`` or the side effects of a natural order gone awry because of that. If we assume the causal connections, plausible or not, then everything depends on justifying human evil itself.
One could attempt to rebut the atheistic argument from natural evils by insisting that all such are either deserved by those who suffer them, as punishment for their bad acts and ``depraved`` dispositions, or useful to those who observe or undergo them, as warnings. Non-humans suffer, too, though surely they neither sin nor are disposed to sin.
Even assuming that natural evils are punishments for bad acts and dispositions, they are extremely heavy-handed. Recalling that God is said to love us as a father loves his children, it is worth contemplating the likely fate of a human father who executed his daughter for missing curfew or the desirable fate of a community that executes a woman for being raped.
Finally, warnings don`t compute any better than punishments. Nor would an infinitely just warner exploit one person to warn another person, in violation of the categorical imperative and the golden rule.
One could attempt to rebut the atheists`argument from natural evils by insisting that all of them are necessary to provide the occasion for certain important virtues, as well as for other necessary features of a best possible world that could not occur without them. If not, then we are back to superfluous virtues and heavy-handedness.
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